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TAXABLE STATUS OF STOCK DIVIDENDS

PRESENT TAXABLE STATUS OF STOCK DIVIDENDS
IN FEDERAL TAX LAW
HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER

STATUS UNDER THE 16TH AMENDMENT

The previous discussion has described the technique employed
by the majority in the Grzffiths Case for avoiding the issue as
to the present constitutional status of Eisner v. Macombcr The
minority of the Court rejected this approach and met that issue
with evident eagerness. Its position thereon was that Eisncr v.
Macomber should be overruled. The dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas, and Messrs. Justices Black and Murphy
joined him therein. This. fact, coupled with that of the majority's
disposition of the case, has led to a great deal of speculation as
to what fate Eisner v. Macomber would meet if the issue of its
constitutional status were to come before the Court. The preponderant view seems to be that it would be overruled. The attempt
to do so is certain to encounter strenuous opposition from taxpayers and their counsel. The discussion that follows will aim at
evaluating the probability of their success in preventing the views
of the minority of the Court in the Griffitlhs Case from becoming
the law of the land.
A consideration of the argument of that minority affords an
easy introduction to the subject. The reasons urged therein to support the theory that all stock dividends are income within the
meaning of the 16th.Amendment are certain to be invoked if that
issue ever reaches the Court. The first of these reasons rests on
the major premise that the term "income" as used in that Amendment includes "everything which by reasonable understanding
can fairly be regarded as income." 3 Its minor premise is, in the
language of the minority, that "Stock dividends representing
profits certainly are income in the popular sense." The appeal to
popular understanding on matters of this character is an appeal to
something that is so vague that what its advocates will do is not
to discover a fact but to create a "fact" consonant with the de30
The minority opinion uses this language taken from the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 237,

40 $'Ct. 189, 204, 64 L. Ed. 521, 541.
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mands of their position. However, that alone will not prevent the
argument from carrying considerable weight, particularly if reinforced by the consideration invoked by the minority in connection with it that "the exclusion of stock dividends from income
permits a person to increase his wealth indefinitely without ever
being subject to an income tax." 37 Nor will it be the only instance in -which judicial creation constitutes the major factor
in determining the meaning of constitutional language. However,
it is unlikely that this approach will be given such a dominant position as it received in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Eisner v. Macomber 38 That it will play a considerable part
in the final determination of this issue is certain. It is too much
in line with current political notions to be left unused. 0
The next argument of the minority may fairly be summarized
as follows (1) The decision in Eisner v. Macomber is based on
the premise that the 16th Amendment precludes treating a corporate shareholder as having received income unless assets are
severed from corporate capital and made available to the shareholder for his separate use, benefit and disposal. (2) The
Koshland and Gowran Cases,40 the Reorgantzation Cases,41 and
others, 42 establish the principle that a shareholder may receive income from the corporation though the corporation distributes no
assets to him, and that, in general, a taxpayer may receive income though he receives neither money nor property (3) The
basic objection to treating stock dividends of the Eisner v.
Macomnber type as income within the 16th Amendment has thus
been removed by the Supreme Court's own decisions. (4) Therefore, that decision should be overruled. This argument will be
37The minority in this connection quotes from an article by Professor
T. R. Powell, Income from Corporate Dividends. 35 Harvard Law Review
363, 376.
38
Mr. Justice Holmes in Eisner v. Macomber stated that "the word
'incomes' in the 16th Amendment should be read in 'a sense most obvious
common understanding at the time of its adoption.'"
to the
39
See on this general subject Irving Fisher and H. W Fisher, ConIncome Taxation, Chapter 12.
structive
4
oKoshland v. Helvering, (1936) 298 U. S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767, 80 L. Ed.
1268, Helvering v. Gowran, (1937) 302 U. S. 238, 58 S. Ct. 154, 82 L.
Ed. 224.
4
'United States v. Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 S. Ct. 63, 66 L.
Ed. 180; Rockefeller v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S. 176, 42 S. Ct.
68, 66 L. Ed. 186, Cullinan v. Walker, (1923) 262 U. S. 134, 43 S. Ct.
495, 67 L. Ed. 906, Marr v. United States, (1925) 268 U, S. 536, 45 S. Ct.
575, 42
69 L. Ed. 1079.
Among those cited are Old Colony Trust Co. v Com'r, (1929) 279
U. S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499, 73 L. Ed. 918, Douglas v. Willcuts, (1935) 296
U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 59. 80 L. Ed. 3, Helvering v. Bruun, (1940) 309 U. S.
461, 60 S. Ct. 631, 84 L. Ed. 864.
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evaluated later on in this article. Suffice it for immediate purposes to state that .the minority does not limit itself, in supportmg proposition (2), to decisions involving the constitutional issue
involved in the instant problem. In fact, it relies in part upon
decisions in which no constitutional issue was raised.
The minority's final position is not so much an argument as a
restatement of the problem. It recognizes that the mere declaration and payment of a stock dividend does not normally increase
the shareholder's wealth, but that the change in his wealth proceeds par passu with the accumulation of corporate earnings.
It, accordingly, states that "The narrow question here is whether
Congress has the power to make the receipt of a stock dividend
based on earnings an occasion for recognizing that accrual of
wealth for income tax purposes.143 However satisfactory such
a method of formulating the problem may be, the minority's reasoning m support of its affirmative answer' leaves much to be desired.
It amounts to little more than a statement that the minority "can
see no constitutional reason for saying that Congress cannot"
choose to compute "the 'income' to the stockholders at the 'fair
market value' of the stock dividends received" since that "is one
way-though perhaps at times a crude one-of measuring for income tax purposes the wealth which normally accrues to stockholders as a result of the earning of their corporation." The emphasis in this line of reasoning is on the method for measuring
the shareholder's income when be receives a stock dividend based
on earnings. The problem of its measurement would arise only
if it be assumed that it has already been decided that the receipt
of such a stock dividend does constitute the receipt by the shareholder of something which comes within the concept of "income"
as that term is used in the 16th Amendment. There are several
assumptions on which the minority's reasoning becomes relevant
and intelligible. If it be assumed that the 16th Amendment gave
Congress the power to determine what should constitute income,
there is in effect an end to judicial review of its decisions on that
.matter. This would involve a violent departure from principles
that have long had the sanction of the Supreme Court, a wider
departure than the minority intended to initiate by its attempt to
overrule Eisner v. Macomber Nor is the adoption of such an
assumption required to give meaning to the minority's argument.
43For a similar approach to other income problems see Rottschaefer,
The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation, 13 M]ixx sorA LAw Rsvizw,

637, at pages 645, 646.
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This can equally Well be done if the 16th Amendment be construed to confer upon Congress the power to determine what
shall constitute income if only its decisions thereon be not wholly
unreasonable and arbitrary The adoption of such a theory would
furnish a rational explanation of the minority's emphasis on the
problem of Congress' power to choose a measure of the income
involved in the receipt of a stock dividend, even though the
measure actually adopted by it might in some cases be a rather
crude one. It is even conceivable that the minority would hedge
Congressional discretion by the implications of its first argument
in which popular conceptions of "income" entered so largely as
the basis for determining the meaning to be given that term in
the 16th Amendment. While this is conceivable, it is improbable
that the minority intended to shackle Congress by any such standard. It is probably necessary to ignore the first of the minority's
arguments in evaluating its last one.
Attention has already been directed to the fact that the minority recognized that measuring the income involved in the receipt
of a stock dividend based on earnings by the market value of
the dividend shares might at times be rather a crude procedure.
The basis for this view is to be found in the following considerations. The increase in a shareholder's wealth represented by his
shares is a function of the corporate net earnings during the
period of his ownership of those shares. 4 4 There is no necessary
equivalence between the increase in the value of any shareholder's
stake in the corporate net assets attributable to the corporate net
earnings during the period of his ownership of the shares and
the market value of the dividend shares which he receives when
a part of those net earnings are capitalized by the declaration and
payment of the stock dividend. If the net earnings during his period of ownership of the shares are less than such market value,
he will be charged with income in excess of the increase in his
wealth represented by his shares, at least so far as that increase
is due to corporate net earnings. 45 It is true that this may give
him an off-setting advantage when he later comes to sell either
the shares with respect to which the dividend was received, or
the dividend shares themselves, or both. But there is no assurance of any exact or approximate equivalence between the advan44
This does not mean that it is the only variable on which such an increase in the shareholder's wealth depends. It means only that those net
earnings
are one of the variables on which said increase depends.
45

See, in connection with this aspect of the problem, E. H. Warren,
Taxability of Stock Dividends as Income, 22 Harv. Law Rev. 885.
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tage at this point and the burden imposed when his income from
the receipt of the stock dividend was measured in the manner employed in the Griffiths Case. The use of such measure in a case of
the kind last described can be held valid under the 16th Amendment if that penmits treating even a merely formal change in an
ultimate owner's relation to a fund of accumulated income as a
decisive factor for charging lum with income in some amount as
of the time when that formal change occurs. It is but a short
step from that position to one that would dispense with even the
transaction involving such formal change. This would inply that
the corporate earnings could be directly charged as income to the
shareholders part passit with their becoming earnings to the corporation.46 That the mnnority might be willing to press the principle at least that far is evident from the following statement in
its opinion. "The wealth of stockholders normally increases as
a result of the earnings of the corporation in which they hold
shares. I see no reason why Congress could not treat that increase in wealth as 'income' to them." The case of Collector v.
Hubbrd4 7 is cited in support of this point of view. There is language in the opinion therein which can be so construed, but the
decision itself cannot be deemed to sustain the position that a
shareholder receives income when his corporation earns income.
In any event, if the minority construes "income," as used in
the 16th Amendment, to permit what was done by the federal income tax act which was before the Supreme Court in Collector v.
Hubbard, then it will be difficult to prevent that term from being construed to include any accretion of wealth, even unrealized
capital gains. However, it cannot be denied that the minority's
reasoning becomes relevant and intelligible if predicated on any
one of the assumptions discussed in this and the preceding paragraphs. The possible implications of its theories extend far beyond the issue of whether stock dividends of the Eisner v.
Macomber type constitute income within the meaning of the 16th
Amendment. It is, therefore, a matter of considerable importance
to taxpayers whether or not the minority view on this constitutional issue ultimately becomes that of a majority of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
46This is clearly inconsistent with the position of the majority of the
Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189,
64 L. Ed. 521.
4r(1871) 12 Wall. 1, 20 L. Ed. 272. The majority opinion in Eisner v.
Macomber, supra, overruled this case and rejected the contention that the
adoption of the 16th Amendment had re-established its position.
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An investigation into the probability of the overruling of Eisner
v. Macomber must cover a wider range of inquiry than an examination of the position of the Court's minority in the Grtffiths
Case. It demands a consideration of the course of judicial decision in dealing with problems of income under federal tax legislation since Eisner v. Macomber was decided. The cases that will
have the most weight are those in which the constitutional concept of income was expressly an issue. However, it will be impossible to ignore those in which courts have supported their
ideas of income by invoking the definition thereof which served
as the major premise supporting the decision in Eisner v. Macomber In what follows, the major decisions only will be considered.
The starting point is, necessarily, the concept of income developed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in Eisner v. Macomber
This has already received considerable attention in the first part
of this article. The discussion at this point will be limited to such
considerations as fit into the general lines of the argument hereinafter set forth. The essential element in the constitutional concept of income was found in the requirement of realization. This
involved as one of its consequences that a mere increase in a
person's wealth during a given period of time would not alone
establish that he had received income which Congress could tax
by methods permitted by the 16th Amendment. Although realized
capital gains do constitute income, 48 unrealized capital gains can
not be taxed as income. But, while Eisner v. Macomber did decide that a particular transaction, namely the receipt of a stock
dividend of the kind and under the circumstance involved in it,
did not involve that type of realization essential to the receipt of
income by the shareholder receiving such a stock dividend tinder
such circumstances, the light which the opinion threw on what
facts would establish the existence of the requisite kind of realization was rather meager. This was due, in large part, to the fact
that the reasoning was formulated in terms applicable primarily
to corporate distributions. However, since its meaning has received more consideration and development in that type of case
than in any other, the decisions involving cases of that class will
have to be considered somewhat more fully at this point than
that accorded them in the first part of this article.
4SMerchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, (1921) 255 U. S. 509,
41 S. Ct. 386, 65 L. Ed. 751.
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The first comprehensive treatment of this matter subsequent
to Eisner v. Macomber occurred in the Reorganm.ation. Cases.'9 It
will suffice to discuss the Phellis Case only. 50 The facts therein
were as follows. A Co. had organized B Co. under the laws of
a state other than that of its own incorporation. It transferred all
of its assets to the latter in exchange for some cash, all of the
preferred stock that B Co: issued, and all of B Co.'s common
stock. The cash was used to pay off a part of A Co.'s bonds, the
preferred stock to redeem the rest of its bonds and preferred
stock, the balance being retained to cover its own common stock
par for par; the common stock was distributed to its stockholders. At the close of the reorganization the net assets of B Co.
available for its common stockholders were less than the net
assets of A Co. available for its stockholders prior to the reorgamzation by the extent of the preferred stock of B Co. retained
by A Co. to cover its own common stock par for par, but an equal
amount of B Co.'s assets were in substance reserved for those
stockholders through their ownership of A Co.'s common stock.
Since the distribution of the common stock of both companies at
the completion of the reorganization was the same as in A Co.
before that time, the proportionality of the stockholders' interests
in A Co.'s original assets was, if substance and not form be regarded, maintained for the same group's interest in the same
assets after their transfer to B Co. The transaction, however,
was held to have involved a realization of income by A Co.'s
stockholders to the extent of the value of the B Co. shares received by them. In the formal sense, of course, those stockholders
received from A Co. a. dividend in property consisting of B Co.
shares, so that there was an actual severance from A Co.'s asiets
for the separate use of its stockholders. However, the argument
most strongly urged against the decision was that A Co.'s stockholders had realized no income because the old and the reorganized
corporations were substantially identical, and -that, therefore,
there had been a mere distribution of certificates indicating an increase m the value of the stQckholders' capital holdings. The Supreme Court denied this contention, holding that the stockholders
of the new corporation had property rights and interests materially
different from those incident to ownership of stock in the old
company. It stated that the result of the distribution of the reor- 9See footnote 41, supra.
-oUnited States v. Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 S. Ct. 63, 66 L.
Ed. 180.
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ganized company's common stock had been to transfer to the stockholders of the original company "new individual property rights
in realization ot their former contingent right to participate
eventually in the accumulated surplus." The significance of this
analysis lay in its indication that realization included the acquisition of an interest in a given group of assets differing from the
former interest therein of those charged with having received income in the transaction which produced such a change of interest.
In Marr v United States,51 another of the Reorganization Cases
and one in which the question of Congress' power to tax such
transactions was squarely discussed, the Supreme Court expressly
approved the government's contention that a stockholder realized
income not only when he acquired "an interest in a different business enterprise or property" but also when he acquired "an essentially different interest in the same business enterprise or property" The result of the Reorganization Cases can be summed tip
in the proposition that a corporate stockholder realizes income
from his investment in his stock whenever the corporation distributes to him, as stockholder, something which gives him an
essentially different interest in the corporate assets than he had
therein before the distribution. The decision 2 that a dividend
paid in the distributing corporation's own bonds constitutes income to the shareholder accords perfectly with this conception
of realization. The result of such a distribution is to transmute
the shareholder's former interest in the corporate assets from
that of ultimate owner to that of creditor.
The last of the group of cases generally described as the Reorganization Cases was decided in 1925. The next important consideration of the constitutional status of corporate distributions
under the 16th Amendment occurred more than a decade later
when the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Koshland
Case.5 3 The facts of this case were as follows A, a preferred
shareholder in B Co., was paid a dividend thereon in the form of
common stock of B Co. He thereafter sold the preferred, and thus
arose the question as to how to compute the gain on that sale.
The Commissioner, applying the applicable Regulations, treated
the receipt of the dividend paid in B Co.'s common stock as the
receipt of capital, and adjusted the gain basis for the preferred
268 U. S. 536, 45 S. Ct. 575, 69 L. Ed. 1079.
Doerschuk v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 739.
53Koshland v. Helvering, (1936) 298 U. S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767, 80 L.
Ed. 1268.
51(1925)
52
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stock to reflect this factor. The issue was A's liability for the additional tax attributable to the resulting increase in gain from
the sale of his preferred stock. It thus became necessary to determine whether the receipt of the common stock as a dividend on
the preferred was a capital receipt or income within the meaning
of the 16th Amendment. The Supreme Court held it to be the
latter, not a capital receipt. It stated that "where a stock dividend
gives the stockholder an interest different from that which his
former stockholdings represented he receives income" within the
meaning of the 16th Amendment. That is, such a distribution involves realization, a point of view completely consistent with
the Court's theories as developed in the Reorganiialion Cases.
There was no further development of the concept of realization
in corporate distribution cases until the decision in 1943 of the
Griffiths, Sprouse and Strassburger Cases.51 It will not be necessary to consider again the contribution that these cases made to
the concept of realization in relation to stock dividends.?5 Suffice
it to say that under them realization is present whenever the
distribution alters the recipient's pre-existing proportionate interest in the corporation, and is present in the case of only such
stock dividends as produce that, effect. It is true that the opinions
in none of the cases discussed in this paragraph use the term
"realization."- But each of them professed to be developing the
implications of Eisner v. Macomber, and may, therefore, be
treated as defining the tests for determining when a distribution
of a stock dividend involves the realization of income by its
recipient. The only other alternative is to treat the Court's failure
to use the word "realization" as an abandonment of the requirement that only realized income is "income" within the meaning
of the 16th .Amendment. The Court may ultimately adopt that
position, but it would be a most doubtful proceeding to conclude
that it had done so in any of the stock dividend cases.
The theory of the constitutional nature of income has received
a more extensive discussion in this series of stock dividend and
reorganization cases than in cases involving other types of situation. The views expressed by the courts in some of the others have
.acertain amount of value in relation to the present problem. This is
54
Helvering v. Griffiths, (1943) 318 U. S. 371, 63 S. Ct. 636, 87 L. Ed.

843., Helvering v. Sprouse, (1943) 318 U. S. 604, 63 S. Ct. 791, 87 L. Ed.

1029; Strassburger v. Com'r of Int. Revenue, (1943) 318 U. S. 604, 63 S.
Ct. 791,
87 L. Ed. 1029.
55See discussion in first part of this article in 28 MrxxsorA LAw Review 106 at pp. 116 ff.
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especially true with respect to Helvering v. Bruim, one of the
cases relied upon by the Supreme Court's minority in the Griffiths
Case. This was the last in a series of cases involving the treatment of improvements made on leased premises by a lessee who
had no right to remove them. It cannot be gainsaid that the
lessor in such a case may have his wealth enhanced as a result
of such a provision in the lease. If the improvements have any
value when he re-enter§ into possession of the leased premises,
his wealth will have been incrased by the amount of that value
during the period beginning with the commencement of *the leasehold and ending with the lessor's re-entry upon the premises. It
will not be necessary to trace the history of the Commissioner's
efforts to deal with this problem.5 7 The first case that needs to be
considered is M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States.5 8 The Commissioner had included in the lessor's income for the first year of the
term an amount computed by dividing the estimated depreciated
value of the improvements at the end of the term by the number
of years in the term. The only part of the Court's opinion here
relevant is that in which it asserts that, while the lessor had an
ownership interest in the improvements during the first year of
the term (the year when they had been made), he had no present
right to use them, and that the acquisition of such an interest
as he then acquired did not amount to a contemporaneous realization of gain within the taxing statute. It was, accordingly, held
that the lessor had realized no income from this series of traisactions during the year in question. Although the Court made no
pretense of deciding a constitutional question, its view as to the
theory of realization of income embodied in the statute may well
represent its opinion as to what constitutes realization of income
within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. In any event, it is
as likely to reflect its then view thereon as are its definitions of
realization in many later cases in which no constitutional issue
was involved but which are nevertheless invoked by proponents
of the view that all stock dividends are income subject to taxation
under the 16th Amendment."
This brings us to the case of Helvering v Bruun. Its essential facts were the same as those in the Blatt Company Case ex56(1940) 309 U. S. 461, 60 S. Ct. 631, 84 L. Ed. 864.

5
7See for a discussion of these matters Lewis v. Pope Estate Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 116 F (2d) 328.
305 U. S. 267, 59 S. Ct. 186, 83 L. Ed. 167
58(1938)
5
9The reference is to such cases as Helvering v. Horst, (1940) 311
U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. Ed. 75, which will be discussed later on in
the text.
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cept that the lessor had retaken possession of the leased premises,
including the improvements made thereon .y the lessee, as a result of the forfeiture of the lease. The net fair market value of
the building which the lessee had erected on the land, as of the
time when the lease -was forfeited, was q dollars.00 The lessor contended that the added value due to the improvements could not
be treated as a gain derived from capital or realized within the
16th Amendment meaning of-income. His argument was, in substance, that it amounted at most to an unrealized capital gain
which remained inextricably blended with the original realty to
which it had been attached. This was merely a new form of the
argument Athat realization required some type of severance of
assets from the capital alleged to be the source of the gain, and
was predicated on the reasoning of Eisncr v. Macomber The
Court answered this contention with the following language. "It
is not necessary to the recognition of taxable gain that he (the lessor-taxpayer in the case before it) should be able to sever the improvement begetting the gain from his original capital. If that were
necessary, no income could arise from the exchange of property;
whereas such gain has always been recognized as realized taxable gain." It is clear that this was not intended by the Court to
express a general proposition that "severance of assets" is never
essential to that type of realization which the Court had held
necessary to the existence of income within the 16th Amendment.
Furthermore, the concept of "severance"at which the Court's
answer was directed was the rather crude one illustrated by a
cash dividend in -which corporate assets are actually transferred
to the shareholders. But long before Helvering v. Brian was decided, the Court-had already substituted therefor the concept of
he acquisition of an interest in an asset differing essentially from
the recipient's interest therein before the occurrence of the incomeproducing transaction, or the acquisition of an interest in a new
asset as a result of such a transaction. The latter is present in
every exchange or sale of property. It is fairly arguable that
realization of the former kind was present in Hclvering v. Bruun.
Prior to the forfeiture of the lease the lessor had a bare legal in-terest that did not carry with it the right to the use or income from the improvements. Immediately thereafter lie had the
right to use it and to the income therefrom. The differences in
6OThis had been arrived at by deducting from the fair market value of
said building as of that time the unamortized cost of the old building thereon which the lessee had demolished in order to construct the new building
thereon.
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his relations to the improvements that resulted from the forfeiture of the lease are as obvious as they are legally and economically significant. 61 In fact, Helvering v. Brium applies the doctrine
of "severance of assets" in the sense that the Court itself had
already given it in the Reorganzaton and the Koshland Cases.
The only thing that was added (and it was not really an addition,
but merely making explicit what was already implicit in the
Court's prior decisions) is found in the Court's statement that
the fact that the gain is a portion of the value of property received by a taxpayer in a transaction does not negative the realization of that gain.
The Court, however, mentions several other examples of transactions involving the realization of income. The first of these is
relief from a liability This must mean relief therefrom by means
involving a transfer to the creditor of an amount of the debtor's
assets less than the amount of the liability discharged thereby
What happens in a case of that kind is that the debtor's interest
in his assets after the partial cancellation of his indebtedness, or
after his advantageous discharge of his liability, is different from
what it was before those transactions occurred. They are relieved
of an economic liability, even though in a particular case the
debtor's sole assets may have been legally exempt from being applied to the payment of his debts. It is clear then that, so far
as his net wealth has been increased by these transactions, he has
realized income within the constitutional sense of that term.02 A
siiilar course of reasoning would show the presence of realization
of income by a debtor whose obligations are 'discharged by the
act of another or by the application thereto of income from property These are the usual examples given in this connection.", It
may, therefore, be said that nothing in the Court's decision or
61
It is, of course, arguable that the lessor's acquisition of the right to
the income from the improvement would reflect itself in his current income
for subsequent years, that to tax him both on the acquisition of that right

and on the subsequent income involves double taxation, and that, therefore,

the taxation of the improvement should be deferred until lie disposed
thereof. These are important considerations, but they happen not to be those
which the courts have recognized in their attempts to formulate the concept
of income found in the 16th Amendment. They have, therefore, been relegated to this footnote instead of being discussed in the main text.
o2See the following cases dealing with this subject. Bowers v. Kerbaugh
Empire Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 170, 46 S. Ct. 449, 70 L. Ed. 886, United
States v. Kirby Lumber Co., (1931) 284 U. S. 1. 52 S. Ct. 4. 76 L. Ed.
131, Helvering v. American 1Dental Co., (1943) 318 U. S. 322, 63 S. Ct.

577, 63
87 L. Ed. 785.

See Old Colony Trust Co. v. C. of I. R., (1929)
S. Ct. 499, 73 L. Ed. 918.

279 U. S. 716, 49
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opinion in Helvernig v. Bruun justifies the view of the minority
in the Griffiths Case that "severance of assets," in the sense
of that phrase developed in the Reorganization and the Koshland
Cases, need never exist in order that a transaction involve realization of income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. Its
reliance upon Helvering v. Bruun is most uncritical. It may well
be that it will ultimately be decided that "severance of assets" in
the foregoing sense is not essential to the realization of income.
But the Court has not yet adopted that view. In fact, it has even
gone so far as to hold that there may be transactions involving
"severance of assets" in that sense which, nevertheless, do not
involve realization of income. 4 And, in any event, nothing in
this line of decisions even suggests that unrealized gain may constitute income within the 16th Amendment.
There is another line of cases in which the Supreme Court has
developed a theory as to what constitutes realization of income.
At least one of them 5 was cited by the minority in the Griffiths
Case in support of its view that all stock dividends should be
treated as income to the recipient. These cases concerned the taxable status of income that had been assigned either directly or
through resort to the trust device. The legal issue therein, which
is relevant to the present inquiry, was that of construing Section
22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code or the corresponding provisions of other Income Tax Acts. That section contains the general
definition of the expression "gross income" as used in these several statutes. The Supreme Court has stated- on more than one
occasion that that provision evidenced an intention on the part of
Congress to exercise the whole of its constitutional power to tax
income. It may, therefore, be assumed that any pronouncements
as to the meaning of the concept "realization of income" found
in the Court'§ opinions in this line of cases may be employed
in attempts to determine the meaning of the term "income" in
the 16th Amendment. The subsequent discussion proceeds on that
basis.
The most significant of such pronouncements is found in the
opinion in Helvering v. Horst."0 The facts of this case were very
simple. A, who owned certain negotiable bonds, during 1934 detached the coupons therefrom shortly before their due dates, and
gave them to his son, B. The coupons were payable during 1934.
64Strassburger v. C. of I. R. (1943) 318 U. S. 604, 63 S. Ct. 791, 87
L. Ed.
65 1029.
Douglas v. Willcuts, (1935) 296 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct 59, 80 L. Ed. 3.
66(1940)

311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. Ed. 75.
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The Commissioner charged A with income for 1934 in the
amount of the face of said coupons, relying upon Section 22(a)
of the Revenue Act of 1934. His action was sustained by the Supreme Court. It will promote an understanding of the significance
of this case if the Court's reasoning is set forth somewhat at
length. The issue was formulated as being whether the transaction described above involved the realization of income to the
donor. It was stated that not all of a taxpayer's economic gain is
income to him, but that all the revenue acts have been construed
as making the realization of income the taxable event rather than
the mere acquisition of the right to receive it.0 1 The question thus
arose of what constitutes realization of income. No exhaustive
answer was sought to be given, but the Court was satisfied at
this point to affirm that "Where the taxpayer does not receive
payment of income in money or property realization may occur
when the last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of
the economic gain which has already accrued to him." The general rule that a taxpayer who acquires a right to receive income
is taxed when he actually receives the income is asserted to be a
mere rule of administrative convenience, not "one of exemption
from taxation where the enjoyment was consummated by some
event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of money or property" What, then, may be validly treated as the "last step" of a
process by which a taxpayer "obtains the fruition of the economic
gain which has already accrued to him," or as the consummation of
his enjoyment of his right to receive income? The answer, stated
,n its most generalized form, is that these decisive events occur
when the taxpayer "has made such use or disposition of his power
-o receive or control the income as to procure in its place other
3atisfactions which are of economc worth." That is, the exercise of
one's power to dispose of one's right to income in order to satisfy
one's wants, or to procure a satisfaction obtainable only by an expenditure pf money or property, constitutes the realization of
income. How extensive is the class of wants whose satisfaction by
this device involves that enjoyment of the assigned income which
constitutes its realization? It would seem to include all wants whose
satisfaction "can be obtained only by the expenditure of money or
property " The examples listed include the purchase of goods, the
payment of the taxpayer's debts, the payment of a campaign or
67

1t should be here noted that the acquisition of the right to receive
income is sufficient where the taxpayer reports on the accruals basis. The
taxpayer in Helvering v. Horst reported on the cash basis.
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community chest contribution, and the payment of a gift to a
favorite son.
The theory of realization devoloped in Helvering v. Horst has
been applied in numerous other cases. The special field in which it
has had its most extensive influence is that in which the question
is whether given income shall be taxed to the assignor of the right
to receive it or to the assignee who in fact receives it. The ,subsequent decisions in which Helvsrng v. Horst has been invoked
have added .nothing of importance to its theory of realization. 8
They have, generally, merely reiterated its view that the power to
dispose of income is equivalent to the ownership of that income,
.and that the exercise of that power to procure its payment to another for the purpose of procuring a satisfaction obtainable only
by an expenditure of money or property involves realization of
that income by the person having the power to dispose thereof.
The question is whether this theory of realization of income has
any significance for the problem of the constitutional status of
stock dividends of the Eisner v. Macoznber type. 9 It is apparent
at once that the question whether income shall be taxed to A or B
is at least sufficiently different from that of whether there is any
income to be charged to either to warrent one in raising the question. It is true that the requirement that income must be realized
to be taxable means it must be realized by some one wilom the
law recognizes as a person. But that seems to be the only point
of similarity between the concept of realization developed in the
cases m which the issue was whether a given receipt was income
or capital and those cases in which the issue was whether something, that all theparties seem to have recognized as income to
some one, should be treated as income of A or B. In fact, the
approaches -to the definition of realization that these two lines of
decisions reveal are wholly different. The fornnr defines the concept by reference to the character of the transaction by which the
taxpayer acquires that which is asserted to be income. The latter
defines it by reference to what he does with it after he has acquired
that which is alleged to be his income. It is in effect a theory that
income is realized when the right to it is so used as to satisfy the
taxpayer's wants. It would furnish an excellent constitutional sup68

See -elvering v. Eubank, (1940) 311 U. S. 122, 61 S. Ct. 149, 85 L.
Ed. 81, Harrison v. Schaffner, (1941) 312 U. S. 579, 61 S. Ct. 759, 85 L.
Ed. 1055.
69This is on the. assumption, made in the text, that the Courtes theory
is one that it would apply-in an appropriate case involving the constitutional issue.
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port (were such a one needed) for the theory that a tax on expenditures for consumer's goods, services, and satisfactions, would be
valid as a tax on income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.7 0 That does not mean that it fits a case in which the transaction alleged to involve the realization of income contains no element of.an exercise by the taxpayer of his control over a right to
receive income. A shareholder who receives a stock dividend, whatever its character, is not exercising a power to control or dispose
of a right to income which right he already possesses. If one wishes
to invent a fiction and describe a shareholder's receipt of a stock
dividend in that manner, well and good. But let it be plainly
labeled as a fiction. So far as the decision in Helvermng v Horst
is concerned, it merely enunciates a theory of what constitutes
realization in a particular class of transactions. It is irrelevant for
other types that do not possess the factor that makes it a reasonable
theory for the transactions in connection with which it was developed and to which it has been applied. Its decision leaves intact
the theories of realization developed in the various Stock Dtvdend
and Reorganization Cases. No logical contradiction is involved in
this dualism, nor will their co-existence involve any practical contradictions unless fictions are invented to produce them. 7'
The discussion up to this point has been directed against the
view that the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases not involving corporate distributions have so modified the meaning of
"realization of income" as to render no longer applicable its theory
in Eisner v Macomber It has also been directed against the position that its decisions in cases involving corporate distributions,
other than Eisner v. Macomber, require its theory of realization expressed therein to be treated as obsolete. It amounts to
no more than a denial of the validity of one line of reasoning
urged in support of the plea to overrule Eisner v Macomber
It does not follow that the Court will not rely upon the theories
herein held inadequate should it overrule that decision. The very
fact that a decision is overruled involves a rejection of at least
the basic premises upon which it was formerly supported. It,
therefore, becomes necessary to inquire whether the course of de7
oSee in this connection the statement in Helvering v. Independent Life
Insurance Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 758, 78 L. Ed. 1311, that
"The rental value of the building used by the owner does not constitute
income
7 within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.
1The discussion of Helvering v. Horst renders unnecessary the consideration of cases that deal with the treatment of income from revocable
trusts, funded insurance trusts, maintenance trusts, alimony trusts, term
trusts, etc. They add nothing to the contribution of Helvering v. Horst.
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cisions involving questions of what constitutes income, rendered
since Eisner v. Macomber, express or imply any principles, or
reflect any judicial attitudes, relevant to our present problem.
Does it reveal instances in which the concepts in which the Court
ha§ stated its definition of income have been given a content reflecting the influence of such factors as fairness in distributing
the tax burden or the practical necessities of securing a workable income tax system? Does it reveal any tendency to uphold
the Congressional interpretation of the 16th Amendment unless
that -is shown to be wholly arbitrary and unreasonable? It may
well be that an inquiry along these lines will afford a safer basis
for predicting the future fate of Eisner v. Macomber than a more
technical analysis of the meaning of decisions directly bearing
on that issue.
The judicial definition of income within the 16th Amendment which has been quoted most frequently by the courts is
that found in the prevailing opinion in Eisner v. Macomber Its
substance is that income is the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined, including the profit gained through
a sale or conversion of capital assets. It is a definition in terms
of the source of the right to receive something of value. The
whole doctrine of realization as an essential element in the definition is based on the words "derived from," which the Court has
frequently contrasted with the characteristics denoted by the language "accruing to" where the gain was from property sources.
The presupposition to the existence of income is the existence
of gain. Despite this, it has been held that the event on whose
occurrence taxable income arises need not itself involve any increase in the taxpayer's wealth. Thus a cash dividend is income
although its distribution involves an equivalent diminution of the
book value of the shareholder's capital interest in the corporation.7 2 It would constitute income even to a shareholder the value
of whose capital interest in the corporation had not increased at
all during his ownership of the stock.:-3 That is, the absence of
any gain accruing-to a shareholder in the transaction that began
with his acquisition of the stock and terminated with the receipt
of a cash dividend thereon does not prevent the cash dividend from
being income within the 16th Amendment. The reasons given to
support these results include (1) that such dividends are the ap-2Lynch v. Hornby, (1918) 247 U. S. 339, 38 S. Ct. 543, 62 L. Ed. 1149.
MSee statement in United States v. Phellis, (1921) 256 U. S. 156, 171,
42 S. Ct 63, 66 L. Ed. 180.
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propriate fruit of stock ownership and are commonly reckoned
as income, and (2) in the case in which the dividend exceeds the
accretion to surplus during the shareholder's ownership of the
stock, that he has stepped into the shoes of the person from
whom he acquired the stock. The latter of these argument also
played a prominent part in Taft v. Bowers14 and in Newman,
Saunders & Co. v United States." The former of these held not
violative of the 16th Amendment the statutory provision requiring
a donee to take the gain basis of the last preceding owner who
did not acquire the property by gift, the latter sustained against
an objection based on that Amendment the provision requiring
those who acquired property in a tax-free transfer to take the
gain basis of the transferror. The taxpayer in each of them had
contended that these provisions resulted in the taxation of capital
as income. The ultimate basis of the argument that the 16th
Amendment permits Congress to treat a taxpayer as though lie
stood in the shoes of a prior owner of the property whose ownership entitles him to its economic gains is found not in economic
analysis but in what the courts consider the reasonable requirements of a fair and adequate income tax system. This is made so
explicit as to leave it in no doubt by the following language in
the opinion in Taft v. Bowers: "The provision of the statute
under consideration seems entirely appropriate for enforcing a
general scheme of lawful taxation. To accept the view urged in
behalf of petitioner (taxpayer) undoubtedly would defeat, to
some extent, the purpose of Congress to take part of all gain
derived from capital investments. To prevent that result and insure enforcement of its proper policy, Congress had power to
require that for purposes of taxation the donee should accept
the position of the donor in respect of the thing received. And in
so doing, it acted neither unreasonably nor arbitrarily"
Reliance upon other than economic factors also explains the
reasoning in Burnet v. Sandford & Brooks Co. 70 The facts of
the case must be stated in order to appreciate the full significance
of the Court's statements. The taxpayer had incurred an operating
loss in the performance of a dredging contract extending over a
period including four taxable years. In one only of those years
did it return net income. Its tax returns for the other three years
showed net losses. In a subsequent year it recovered the amount
of its total loss on the contract from the United States. The is74(1929)
278 U. S. 470, 49 S. Ct. 199, 73 L. Ed. 460.
5
(Ct. C1. 1929) 36 Fed. (2d) 1009.
76(1931) 282 U. S. 359, 51 S, Ct. 150, 75 L. Ed. 383.
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sue, in- the case was the taxable status of that recovery.' It was
admitted that it had made no gain on the contract even after including the recovery in its gross receipts therefrom. The amount
recovered was held to be income for the year of recovery despite
the taxpayer's contention that this violated the 16th Amendment.
Here again the absence of economic gain from a transaction (or,
if one prefers, from the series of transactions comprising the
performance of the contract) was held not to prevent the receipt
of something of value from being income although it merely recouped a prior operating loss.-- In reply to the constitutional
objection the Court stated that the 16th Amendment "was
adopted to enable the government to raise revenue by taxation ;"
that the "essence of any system of taxation" consists in the production of revenue "ascertainable, and payable" at regular intervals, and that "Only by such a system is it practicable to
produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assessment, and collection capable of practical operation."
Starting from the undeniable premise that income is a function
of time, the Court in effect asserts that it is for Congress to decide whether that period shall be defined in terms of each separate income producing transaction or some definite period, and
that its choice of the latter is not invalid though it may involve
treating income as derived from transactions which, separately
considered, involve no economic gain for the taxpayer. The point
of present interest is that this method and its results are justified
by what Congress deemed reasonably necessary for devising an
income tax system that would be administratively desirable and
promote desirable fiscal policies.
The case just considered should be contrasted with the German M11ark Case.-- The taxpayer had borrowed money repayable
in German marks. The proceeds of the loan had been used to
finance the performance of construction contracts by its subsidiary, and were lost. In a subsequent year it repaid its loan in
depreciated marks. The question was whether the difference between the dollar value of the proceeds of the loan and the number of dollars paid to acquire the marks that paid off the loan
constituted income. The difference was less than the losses in7
71nterest on the amount of the recovery was admitted to be income
and was not in dispute.

7sIt does not appear whether the losses on the contract in question had

resulted
79 in any tax benefits to the taxpayer.
Bowers v. Kerbaugh Empire Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 170, 46 S. Ct. 449,

70 L. Ed. 886.
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curred by it in financing its subsidiary's construction contracts.
-It was this latter factor that led the Court to decide that the taxpayer had received no income through the advantageous discharge
of its liability On its face the decision seems inconsistent with
the theory of Burnet v. Sandford & Brooks Co. The Court, in its
opinion in that case, distinguished it on the score that the taxpayer in the German Mark Case "had neither made a profit on
the transaction, nor received any money or property which could
have been made subject to the tax." Since the former of these
factors was equally present in Burnet v. Sandford & Brooks Co.,
the sole basis for the distinction must be found in the latter factor
But that statement is true only of the final transaction, i.e., the repayment of the loan in depreciated German marks. But this can
have no significance in view of the later decision that the repurchase by a taxpayer of its bonds for less than the consideration
received on their issue involves gain and taxable income for the
year of the repurchase.8 0 Hence, the German Mark Case can no
longer be treated as requiring generally a correlation between
the existence of gain and the existence of income in the constitutional sense. The 'theory of Burnet v. Sandford & Brooks Co.
must be accepted as entitled to greater weight than that of
the German Mark Case.
The discussion of the tvo cases last referred to furnishes a
natural basis for considering the decisions involving the treatment of recoveries and surplus adjustments. It has always been
the practice of the Treasury to treat as income for the year of
recovery amounts recovered with respect to bad debts deducted
during a prior year which is no longer open due to the running
of the statute of limitations. The same statement applies to recoveries for expenses, taxes, and losses previously deducted. The
real basis for such a procedure is that a taxpayer should not be
permitted to gain an advantage to which the ultimate facts show
him not to be entitled. In some of these cases he actually receives something of value with respect to the transaction in the
year for which he is charged with income. But this is not essential to the application of the principle. In some instances he will
have received the money or property in a prior year. Thus in
one case the owner of gas lands received a bonus on the execution of a gas lease thereon. He deducted depletion on the percentage of gross method in computing his taxable income for
SOUmted States v. Kirby Lumber Co., (1931) 284 U. S. 1, 52 S. Ct.
4, 76 L. Ed. 131.
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the year of the receipt of the bonus. The lease was surrendered
before there had been any production under the lease. It was
held that he could be required to treat as income for the year
of the surrender of the lease an amount equal to the depletion
previously deducted.sl It was held that to require this adjustment did not violate the 16th Amendment, and stated that the
only question involved was the year in which income shall be
reported. In the situation involved in this case the taxpayer had
in fact received something of value at the beginning of the series
of transactions comprised of the making of the lease, the receipt
of the bonus, taking a depletion deduction, and the surrender of
the lease. But that-this is not essential can be illustrated by tie
following example. Assume that a taxpayer on the accruals basis
deducts a tax accrued but not paid during a given taxable year,
and that said tax is never paid because the statute imposing it is
held unconstitutional. There 'is no doubt but that he may be
charged with income in the amount of said deduction for the
year in which it is finally determined that the tax was invalid,
at least if the year in which the deduction was taken is no longer
open. Yet, in such a case nothing occurs but a surplus adjustment; nothing is received by the taxpayer at any stage of this
series of transactions. Does the taxpayer charged with income
in connection with transactions of the character considered in
this paragraph secure an economic gain therefrom? An affirmative answer alone is possible. This is so regardless of whether
he has retained or lost the money or property received in connection with such a series of transactions if he received any at all.
It is equally so in the last example, for in that case his net
wealth is actually greater by the amount of the tax which was
never paid than the figure at which he stated it. It is immaterial
that the effect of other transactions occurring during the same
period may have reduced his net wealth at the end of that period
below what it was at the beginning thereof. The 16th Amendment permit5 Congress to require the adjustment to be made
in the manner indicated because subsequent events have negatived
the factual basis on which alone the prior deduction of the item
was permitted. The question whether the 16th Amendment demands that the amount includible in income as a result of transactions of this character shall be limited by the tax-benefit rule
767

8'Sneed v. Com'r of Int. Rev., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941) 119 Fed. (2d)
See also Lamont v. Com'r of Int. Rev., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1941) 120

Fed. (2d) 996.
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has never been definitely settled by the Supreme Court. 2 It is
practically certain that that Amendment.will never be held to mipose that limit where the recoveries or surplus adjustments are
connected with the prior deduction of operating expenses or
losses. It is doubtful that it will be construed to impose that limit
even where the recovery is of a part of the cost of a capital
asset which had been sold during a prior taxable year at a
loss. It should be construed to impose. such limit if the principle
that the cost of capital investments must be recovered before
there can be a capital gain taxable as income still prevails83
It has already been stated that the Supreme Court's classical
definition of the term "income" as used in the 16th Amendment
presupposed the existence of.gain in order that there be income.
It has been shown (1) that, despite this implication of that definition, income may be treated as arising on the occurrence of an
event though the taxpayer's wealth is not increased as a result
thereof, (2) that a person may be charged with having received
income from his ownership of property though no gain has accrued to him with respect thereto during the period of his
ownership up to the occurrence of the event on which income is
charged to him, (3) that one person may be charged with gain
accruing during a predecessor's ownership of the property, and
(4) that he may be charged with income on the occurrence of a
given event solely because it is a proper moment for adjusting
understatements of his net wealth resulting from deductions made
in connection with prior income tax computations. It must be
admitted that the course of the decisions summarized in those
propositions reveals a tendency to interpret the term "gain"
rather liberally in favor of the government, and thus a like tendency in defining income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment. But even more important are the factors that induced the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to reach the decisions
that lie back of those propositions. These were pointed out in
connection with the discussion of the cases themselves, and nieed
not again be stated. It suffices to say that the Court has recognized
that the 16th Amendment may be, and must be, interpreted in
the light of ideas of income prevailing in the community at the
time of the adoption thereof, that it permits Congress to define
s2See the discussion of this matter in Dobson v. Com'r of Int. Rev.,
(1943) ...... U. S ....... 64 S. Ct. 639, 88 L. Ed..........
s 3See Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, (1918) 247 U. S. 179, 38 S. Ct, 467,
62 L. Ed. 1054.
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income in such manner as to produce an income tax system that
will be capable of practical administration, that it permits
Congress to so define it as to insure a tax contribution from all
increases in wealth accruing since the adoption of the Amendment; and that its conicept of income penmits a transaction to be
treated as one involving the realization of income when this is
a just and reasonable method for preventing a taxpayer from
obtaining an unfair advantage merely because subsequent events
have negatived the factual basis on -which the right to a deduction was conditioned. It is, furthermore, implicit in the proposi-tions set forth above that the element of "realization of income"
must have been deemed present in all the transactions, or series
of transactions, summarized by them. For example, the accruals
basis taxpayer who accrued a deduction for a tax, from whose
payment he was relieved by subsequent events, must be deemed to
have realized income in the year when it was finally determined
that he would never be called upon to pay that tax, despite the
fact that he received no kmoney or property either then or when
he took the deduction. It is not at all improbable that the Court
may adopt the same liberal attitude in construing the expression
"derived from," found in its definition of income, that it has
adopted in construing the meaning of the term "gain" as used
in that definition. It is not at all unlikely that it could thus revise its concept of "realization" by invoking considerations of
policy or by accepting Congressional decisions thereon as beyond review, unless clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. Resort to
considerations of tax policy has become an accepted procedure
when the Supreme Court has ,had to define the jurisdictional
limits imposed on states by the due. process clause of the 14th
Amendment" 4 The 16th Amendment does not give as sweeping
opportunity for the employment of that technique as does the
14th Amendment, but it does afford some opportunity for it.
Since it has already been used by the Court in developing the
scope of one of the essential elements in its definition of income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment, there is
every likelihood that it will use it in developing the meaning of
the expression "derived from" found in that same definition.
And that would mean that considerations of tax%policy may become the dominant factors in redefining "realization of income."
S4See, for example, Newr York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, (1937) 300
U. S. 308, 57 S. Ct. 466, 81 L. Ed. 668, Curry v. McCanless, (1939) 307
U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339; State Tax Commission of Utah v.
Aldrich, (1942) 316 U. S. 174, 62-S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 1358.
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And that, in turn, would mean that they may become the decisive
factors in determining the extent to which the 16th Amendment
permits the taxation of stock dividends as income.
The conscious resort to considerafions of policy in defining
"income" as used in the 16th Amendment will be greatly facilitated
in connection with the question of the constitutional character of
stock dividends if the issue is stated in the manner in which
the minority formulated it in the Griffiths Case. It was framed as
being whether the 16th Amendment permitted Congress to "make
the receipt of a stock dividend based on earnings an occasion
for recognizing that accrual of wealth for income tax purposes."
The question, as conceived by the minority, is not whether the
receipt of such stock dividend constitutes income, but whether
that event furnishes an occasion for subjecting an accrual of
wealth to an income tax. The prior method for stating the issue
focused attention on the meaning of the term "income," a term
about which economists and financial experts had been battling
for an indefinitely long time. It was quite natural that the courts
should find themselves enmeshed in the same disputes when they
were forced to define it. It was to be expected that their reasoning would recognize technical considerations developed by the
experts. The minority's form of stating the question has no tendency to stress such theorizing 'about income as the decisive factor in determining whether Congress may treat a particular event
as the occasion for taxing the owner of corporate shares with respect to an increase in their value due to the accumulation of corporate net earnings. It is a practical certainty that the minority
is willing to decide the issue on the general reasonableness of making the receipt of a stock dividend paid from earnings the occasion for imposing an income tax on the recipient. It has already
indicated what its answer will be if the Court should ever have
the issue before it for decision. The question then is whether
a sufficient number of the majority in the Grffiths Case are likely
to approach the issue from the same general point of view The
very fact that the majority avoided the constitutional issue may
well signify its dissatisfaction with Eisner v Macomber, but an
unwillingness to give a change in law on that matter an unjust
retroactivity If that be the correct interpretation of the majority's
decision, it implies its rejection of the kind of reasoning on
which the majority in Eisner v Macomber based its decision.
This does not necessarily mean its willingness to adopt in its
entirety the approach and reasoning of the minority in the
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Griffiths Case, but it is a highly probable inference that it means
just that. If so, Eisner v. Macomber is doomed.
There is always the possibility that the present Court may
follow the line of reasoning employed by Mr. Justice Brandeis
in his dissenting opimon in Eiser v. Macomber The likelihood
of this can best be appraised if the reasoning of that opinion is
first stated and analyized: It consists of a series of separate arguments that vary markedly in the degrees of their plausibility
and cogency. The basic premise of the most important of them
is that a stock dividend (i.e., one lcharged against earned surplus)
is a device by which a corporation "can, without increasing its
indebtedness, keep for corporate purposes accumulated profits,
and yet, in effect, distribute those profits among its stockholders."
It is stated that this method, and that in which the corporation
issues rights and concurrently declares and pays a cash dividend
which can be applied on the purchase price of the share to which
the right entitles the shareholder, are in substance equivalent and
had always been recognized as equivalent by financiers before
and at the time of-the adoption of the 16th Amendment. It is
quite true, as Mr. Justice Brandeis states, that "the financial
results to the corporation and to the stockholders of the two
methods are substantially the same" if the results are measured
by their effect upon. the net wealth of the stockholder. But it is
undeniable that-resort to the second method gives the stockholder a choice that he 'is denied under the first of them, and
that may not be an unimportant consideration for at least some
of the stockholders. The second premise of this argument is
that the 16th Amendment should be liberally construed in favor
of the taxing power unless there is something in its language or
in the nature of corporate dividends requiring a different approach. There follows a long argument that there is nothing in
the nature of corporate distributions demanding a strict construction of the Amendment. A considerable part of this phase of tile
reasoning stresses the fact that the form in which corporate earnings shall be distributed is a matter-of financial policy having no
bearing on the character of the distribution as income or capital.
Another part follows the pattern of stating a case involving a
corporate dividend' paid in its own stock, asserting that such a
dividend would be recognized as income, and then drawing the
inference that. such a case is indistinguishable from the dividend
involved in Eisner v. Macomber It is unfortunate for this particular approach that some of the distributions which Mr. Justice
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Brandeis categorically affirms would be admittedly income within
the 16th Amendment have since been held not to be such. In any
event the general effect of this first major argument is far from
convincing. The argument in effect asserts that the capitalization
of an earned surplus by the payment of a stock dividend is a distribution of the earnings thus capitalized. Its force is not greatly
enhanced by the argument that no prior decision of the Court
requires it to adopt what is decribed as the narrow interpretation
of the 16th Amendment on which the decision of the majority
of the Court was based. However, it contains many elements
that the Court of today will deem valid.
The line of reasoning just analyzed relied in some measure
upon the common understanding of the character of stock dividends prevailing in the financial community when the 16th
Amendment was adopted. In line with this appeal is the reference
to the treatment of stock dividends under the Massachusetts income tax law, 5 and in the life tenant-remainderman cases. The
argument is within the limits of permissible legal reasoning. The
appeal to the common or general meaning of the word "income"
has been often used in income'tax cases. However, it is at least
questionable whether there ever existed that general understandIng of what constitutes income, and of the character of stock
dividends as income or capital, to rate this line of reasoning
as anything but a general invitation to the courtsto engage In
imaginative exploits. However, it is likely to play a considerable
part in the ultimate decision of the constitutional status of stock
dividends under the 16th Amendment.
This view that the meaning of the term "income" in the 16th
Amendment is to be found in the intention of the people when
adopting it is one element in the last of Mr Justice Brandeis'
argument. It is asserted that the exclusion of stock dividends
representing profits from what can be constitutionally taxed as
income affords the opportunity to "the owners of the most successful businesses in Americ;i
to escape taxation on a large
part of what is actually their income," since, "So far as their
profits are represented by stock received as dividends, they will
pay these taxes not upon their income, but only upon the income
of their income." It is concluded that it is inconceivable that the
people intended such a result when the Amendment was adopted,
especially since stock dividends representing profits were res.,Trefry v. Putnam, (1917) 227 Mass. 522, 116 N. E. 904.
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garded as income "not only by the plain people, but by investors
and financiers, and by most of the courts of the country." This
method of defining "income" within the 16th Amendment is
likely to be favorably received' today not only by the lower
courts but also by the Supreme Court. They are very likely to
accept not only this general approach but also the particular employment thereof found in this one of Mr. Justice Brandeis' arguments.
What is the likelihood that the present Supreme Court will
adopt, or at least follow, the line of reasoning of Mr. Justice
Brandeis?' Its probable response to his particular arguments has
already -been indicated. It is also likely to accept his position that
the 16th Amendment might well permit Congress to treat corporate shareholders in the same way in which partners are treated
with respect to partnership income. In any event, the Supreme
Court of today is much more likely to adopt the reasoning of
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Eisner v. Macomber than
it is to follow that of Mr. Justice Pitney in the majority opinion
of that case.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to escape the conclusion that
Eisner v. Macomber will be overruled as soon as the issue of
its status comes up for decision before the Supreme Court. This
will happen not because anything in its decisions since the case
was decided require that result, but because of a changed attitude on its part with respect to those constitutional limitations
concerned with the protection of individual property rights,
whether those are based on express limitations or are implicit
in the language in which a grant of power is made. It was the
aim of the discussion up to this point to present the reasons that
lend support to that point of view. The implications of this change
in the judicial construction of the 16th Amendment deserve at
least a brief treatment. These will depend upon the reasons which
the Court will u'rge in support of its overruling of Eisner v.
Macomber The minority opinion in the Griffiths Case never
once employed the expression "realization of income," nor is the
concept denoted thereby any necessary element in its argument.
The opinion does, however, aim to show that the decisions subsequent to Eisner v. Macoinber have eliminated the necessity for
the existence of that type of realization denoted by the expression "severance of corporate assets for the separate use of the
shareholder." Its position in that respect is correct. It is silent
as to the other denotations of the "realization" concept. The ques-
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tion arises whether this treatment of the former requirement for
the existence of income within the 16th Amendment may be taken
as intended to eliminate the requirement of realization. The only
alternative is to interpret its opinion as evidence that it believes
realization to be present in the receipt of a stock dividend of the
Eisner v. Macomber type, that is, that it is revising the concept
without intending to eliminate it. There is nothing in the opmion itself that conclusively establishes which of these two possible positions represents its real view It is, of course, true that
the shareholder did receive a stock dividend, and that the minority would still require some similar event before it would hold
that an "accrual of wealth" could be subjected to an income tax.
If that be its theory, then the theory of realization "has been
merely expanded to include situations formerly held not to involve its presence. This would still leave much of the former concept unimpaired. However, if the minority's opinion be construed
to eliminate the requirement, then there would be no reason
why unrealized capital gains could not be treated as income
within the 16th Amendment. The direct taxation to the shareholders of the corporate annual net income would then also be
possible under the 16th Amendment. It is to be hoped that, if
and when the Supreme Court does overrule Eisner v Jlacomber,
it will make its position on this point clearer than has the
minority in the Grtffiths Case.
It has been hereinbefore suggested that the Court might overrule Eisner v Macomber on the basis of the reasoning in Mr.
Justice Brandeis' dissent therein. That opinion, as does the dissent in the Grzffiths Case, supports the taxability of stock dividends with an argument ultimately based on the theory that the
16th Amendment permits Congress to ignore the corporate entity in taxing the shareholders. The analogy of the partnership
is invoked in support of that position. The net result is that Mr
Justice Brandeis would permit Congress to tax the corporate net
income directly to the shareholders. And it is fairly arguable
that the minority in the Griffiths Case supports that position. If this
argument is accepted by the Court if and when it overrules Eisner
v Macomber, it will be an added reason for permitting what
would also be permissible were the requirement of realization
abolished. But this argument would furnish no basis for concluding that unrealized capital gains in general could be deemed
income within the 16th Amendment. It may be stated here that
the annual taxation of the corporation's annual net income di-
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rectly to shareholders might well be used to eliminate some of
the injustice to shareholders inherent in taxing both corporate
net income and the dividends paid therefrom.
REDEFINITION OF "DmncT TAX"
It was suggested in the first part of this article that a decision
that stock dividends of the Eisner v. Maconiber type did not
constitute income within the 16th Amendment would not mean that
they were not taxable unless it were also determined that a tax
on their receipt would constitute a direct tax. Their receipt could
be taxed even were such tax a direct tax, but in that case the
tax would have to be apportioned. among the states on the basis of
their respective populations.s" This would interpose an insuperable practical difficulty to their taxation, and this type of tax will,
therefore, be ignored m the subsequent discussion. In Eisner v.
Macoinber the Government had argued (as an alternative theory
-for sustaining the tax on stock dividends) that the taxing statute imposed the tax not upon the. stock dividend but upon "the
stockholder's share of the undivided profits previously accumulated by the corporation, the tax being levied as a matter of convenience at the time such profits became manifest through the
stock dividend." The majority of the Court rejected this on the
score that the stockholder's interest in the earned surplus is
capital, that a tax thereon would be a tax on property because
of its ownership, and that such a tax would be a direct tax
which could be imposed only subject to the apportionment requirement applicable to direct taxes. The question arises whether
the judicial theory as to what constitutes a direct tax has so
changed since Eisner v. Macomnber as to justify the conclusion
that the above theory is no longer valid. The decisions holding
a tax on persons because of their general ownership of property
to be a direct tax are still recognized as good law But it is still
equally good law that a tax upon a particular use of property,
or upon the exercise of a "single power over property incidental
to its ownerslup," is an indirect tax.s Formally at least, a tax on
the receipt of a stock dividend is not imposed because of the
recipient's general ownership of the' shares on which .the dividend
is paid. It may be conceived as a tax on the exercise of a
s6U. S. C. A., Constitution, Article 1, Sections 2 and 9.
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See, in this connection, Bromley v. McCaughn, (1929) 280 U. S. 124,
50 S. Ct 46, 74-L. Ed. 226.
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single right inhering in the ownership of the shares, namely, that
of receiving the dividend shares. The tax might then be held to
be an excise subject only to the requirement of geographical uniformity 8 The fact that Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting
opinion in Eisner v. Macomber viewed the Government's argutment (referred to above) favorably increases the likelihood that
it would secure the assent of the present Court. It is true that
he appears to have treated it as relevant to deciding what Congress could do under the 16th Amendment, while in the present
discussion the issue is what Congress could do apart therefrom.
But this distinction can readily be ignored, particularly when it
is recalled that the basis of the Government's view was found
89
in Collector v Hubbard,
a case decided long before the 16th
Amendment. It is the writer's opinion that the device hereinbefore suggested as one for converting the tax on the receipt of a
stock dividend from a direct tax into an excise would be ain
extremely specious evasion of the direct tax provisions of the
Constitution. It may be said in concluding the discussion of this
approach to the treatment of stock dividends for tax purposes
that it is quite unlikely that it will ever be adopted by the Court,
The reason therefor is that it is likely to so interpret the 16th
Amendment as to permit subjecting stock dividends of every type
to income taxation. That will render the approach that has just
been considered unnecessary
CONCLUSION

It is fairly obvious from the preceding discussion that the
likelihood is very great that Eisner v. Macomber will be overruled on the first opportunity The problems that will arise if
and when that has been done will concern the implications thereof.
These will depend upon the reasoning on which the overruling
decision will be based. Some of these have been indicated in the
preceding discussion, but others are likely to arise that are not
now foreseeable. The old landmarks of constitutional law have
been gradually obliterated in other fields. It is only a question
of time before Eisner v. Macomber will have joined other time
honored decisions.
8SU. S. C. A.. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1.

89(1870) 12 Wall. 1, 20 L. Ed. 272.

